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SUBJECT: VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999: CFE SUSPENSION CASTS LONG  
SHADOW AT GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE SEMINAR

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Discussion of future challenges and opportunities in the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 was overshadowed at times by concern over the impasse created by Russia's suspension of its CFE commitments. Although most national representatives and several of the speakers called for continued work on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the FSC, there was also recognition that Vienna Document inspections and evaluations could not replace the CFE verification regime. Much attention was given to the Vienna Document "quota race" but many of the remedies discussed relied on voluntary measures and use of multi-national inspection teams rather than reordering the inspection calendar along the lines of a recent German proposal in the FSC. There was little enthusiasm for broadening the scope of the Vienna Document to somehow address new threats such as terrorism and proliferation. Many of the representatives urged a renewed emphasis on "classical" arms control and there was much informal speculation that a new U.S. administration might be more engaged with arms control. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) The German Foreign Office sponsored a seminar on the Vienna Document 1999 in Berlin March 11-13. The seminar was one of a series organized by Germany on conventional arms control. Over 60 representatives of OSCE participating States attended, including Russia, France, Canada, the UK, Georgia, and Moldova. The Central Asia ps were absent, although a diplomat from the Kazakhstan embassy in Berlin was on the participant list.

Groening: Time to Adapt Vienna Document

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13. (SBU) Ambassador Friedrich Groening, German Federal Commissioner for Arms Control, declared in his welcoming remarks that some arms control measures are "out of synch" with current reality and need to be revised. Groening cited the "quota race" as an example and said it "needed to be fixed." It was, he concluded, time to adapt the Vienna Document to the current security situation in the Euro-Atlantic area.

#### Limits of Arms Control

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14. (SBU) Pal Dunay of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, addressed the role of the Vienna Document and the expectations of participating States. Dunay noted that "classical" arms control was predicated on the assumption that more familiarity leads to better relations. But there were times when the opposite resulted: for example, when discussing an Open Skies type inspection regime with South Asian air force commanders, one remarked of his neighbor to Dunay, "We know them, that's why we hate them." Expectations, Dunay concluded, had to be based on the capacities of the arms control instrument.

15. (SBU) Dunay also cited a recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute criticism that the Vienna Document aims "to prevent the now most unlikely conflict between the now most unlikely antagonists." Nonetheless, he saw three possible approaches to reinvigorate the Vienna Document: (1) stricter observance and implementation; (2) an "escape forward" through new measures; or (3) some combination of the first two approaches.

USOSCE 00000070 002.2 OF 004

#### U.S. Arms Control Skepticism

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16. (SBU) Dunay said although current U.S. skepticism of arms control was based on its global threat assessments, rather than an exclusive European focus, communication on arms control and CSBMs at the OSCE might become increasingly important as the CFE suspension impasse was likely to be protracted. (Note: Many of the seminar participants informally discussed the U.S. presidential campaign in great detail. Most concluded that the next U.S. administration, regardless of party, would be more active in arms control. End note.)

#### Russia Misses "Old" Arms Control

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17. (SBU) At the same time, Dunay assessed that Russia feels betrayed by the current arms control arrangement, a feeling that, in Dunay's opinion, was not entirely without merit. He offered that Russia misses "old arms control" and would like to return to a more traditional approach, if for no more than symbolic reasons.

18. (SBU) Dunay speculated, in response to the question whether the Vienna Document would have a future after the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty (A/CFE), it was unlikely A/CFE would enter into force soon, citing Russian foreign minister Lavrov's concern over the size of "potential" NATO forces even though NATO was currently well below CFE limits. Dunay wondered whether NATO could "meet Russia half-way over Istanbul" commitments. He recalled then Secretary of State Albright promised "to leave no state

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behind" at Istanbul, adding he believed this "might be overdoing it."

#### A Russian Replies

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¶9. (SBU) Disagreeing with Dunay's comments regarding Russian nostalgia for "old arms control," Sergey Federyakov, counselor in the Russian MFA Department of Security Affairs and Disarmament, argued that a new generation of officers and diplomats are leading the MoD and MFA in this area. Federyakov asserted that European security should be indivisible, and that if one country felt insecure, then there was no security. It should be, he said, no surprise then that Russia had suspended implementation of CFE. Russia had warned of its discontent for long time but the U.S. and Europe had ignored Russian concerns and were focused only on their own security. Although NATO was expanding up to Russia's borders, Europe must realize that European security is indivisible. Despite suspension of CFE, Russia remained interested in arms control that was based on treaties. Dunay replied that there was also a need to address Russia's attempts to inhibit its neighbors' security arrangements.

#### CPC Works with "Reluctant" Participating States

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¶10. (SBU) Anton Martyniuk of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), said that his organization had shifted its focus from documenting non-compliance to enhancing transparency and contacts with participating States with less

USOSCE 00000070 003 OF 004

experience and capacity in arms control and CSBMs. He described CPC outreach to Tajikistan that reversed unfavorable reporting and compliance trends there, and ongoing efforts to encourage Uzbekistan to return to more active participation in the Vienna Document and other CSBMs.

¶11. (SBU) Martyniuk noted the "tremendous" increase in the number of inspections under the Vienna Document in early 2008 in the wake of Russia's suspension of its CFE obligations. For the future, Martyniuk said there was no political consensus to develop new CSBMs, or even refine existing ones. He noted that arms control tools to address ongoing crises do not yet exist at the OSCE.

#### New Challenges for Vienna Document

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¶12. (SBU) Jeffrey McCausland, former NSC director for arms control, discussed the possibilities and limitations of the Vienna Document. He recommended several areas for future development: (1) renewed efforts on regional CSBMs (Chapter X) with a focus of perhaps the Balkans or the Caucasus; (2) greater efforts to enhance transparency in SALW and conventional ammunition transfers; (3) expanded export controls for MANPADS; and (4) export of the OSCE program in arms control and CSBMs to other regions outside Europe.

#### Russo-Chinese CSBMs

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¶13. (SBU) Vladislav Verchenko, deputy director in the First Asian Department at the Russian MFA, described progress begun during the Soviet period at developing CSBMs with China along the common border. These have since been expanded under the "Five Power CSBM Border Agreement" to include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The agreement includes exchanges of data, limits on forces according to geographic zones, and reciprocal inspections.

#### Quota Race Dominates Implementation Discussion

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¶14. (SBU) Three working groups were held to discuss: (1) current implementation issues; (2) regional agreements under Chapter X, Vienna Document; and (3) the future of the Vienna Document. Group one's focus on current implementation issues quickly evolved into a debate over the quota race. Discussions proceeded along familiar themes: the importance of eliminating the race, the preservation of pS rights, and

an emphasis on restraint. Many participants weighed in with possible solutions, including: emphasizing bilateral arrangements and multi-national teams, increasing the number of team members, increasing the number of quotas, lowering the threshold for assessing evaluation visits, and creating an entirely new CSBM to allow for additional confidence building visits. While discussion proved lively, no proposal gained wide support. Pierre von Arx, military adviser in the Swiss delegation at the OSCE, capped the discussion by predicting that under the current political atmosphere in Vienna, none of the proposed solutions would be adopted.

CFE Suspension Clouds Future of Vienna Document  
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115. (SBU) Discussion in group three on the future of the

USOSCE 00000070 004 OF 004

Vienna Document ranged widely over current issues such as the CFE suspension and the quota race. There was broad agreement that ongoing CFE issues would continue to hamper work on CSBMs in the FSC. The group also largely agreed that the quota race needed to be addressed in the near future, although there was no preferred solution, although voluntary measures and multi-national inspection teams received the most attention. While no one disputed that there were new and emerging issues like proliferation of WMD and MANPADS that required attention, there was no suggestion that the Vienna Document was the right instrument to address these issues. To use the Vienna Document to counter MANPADS proliferation, said one participant, was "like pouring water into a bottle of good wine."  
SCOTT